Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?

被引：17

作者：

Bassetto, Marco ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Fed Reserve Bank, 90 Hennepin Ave, Minneapolis, MN 55401 USA

[2] IFS, Brookfield, WI 53005 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 108卷

基金：

欧盟地平线“2020”;

关键词：

Cheap talk; Credibility; Odyssean; Delphic; Central bank; MONETARY-POLICY; SOCIAL VALUE; DISCRETION; MODEL; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.015

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment ("Odyssean") by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information ("Delphic"). I analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages. Without private information, the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements: Pure Odyssean forward guidance is redundant. With private information, communication can have social value. Forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank's private information about its own preferences or beliefs. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：69 / 86

页数：18

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