Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?

被引:16
作者
Bassetto, Marco [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank, 90 Hennepin Ave, Minneapolis, MN 55401 USA
[2] IFS, Brookfield, WI 53005 USA
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
Cheap talk; Credibility; Odyssean; Delphic; Central bank; MONETARY-POLICY; SOCIAL VALUE; DISCRETION; MODEL; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.015
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment ("Odyssean") by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information ("Delphic"). I analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages. Without private information, the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements: Pure Odyssean forward guidance is redundant. With private information, communication can have social value. Forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank's private information about its own preferences or beliefs. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 86
页数:18
相关论文
共 45 条
[1]   OPTIMAL CARTEL EQUILIBRIA WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].
ABREU, D ;
PEARCE, D ;
STACCHETTI, E .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) :251-269
[2]   TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].
ABREU, D ;
PEARCE, D ;
STACCHETTI, E .
ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (05) :1041-1063
[3]   Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare [J].
Amador, Manuel ;
Weill, Pierre-Olivier .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2010, 118 (05) :866-907
[4]  
Angeletos G.-M., 2018, WORKING PAPER
[5]  
Angeletos G.-M., 2018, J POLITICAL EC
[6]   Efficient use of information and social value of information [J].
Angeletos, George-Marios ;
Pavan, Alessandro .
ECONOMETRICA, 2007, 75 (04) :1103-1142
[7]   Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge [J].
Angeletos, George-Marios ;
Lian, Chen .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2018, 108 (09) :2477-2512
[8]   POLICY WITH DISPERSED INFORMATION [J].
Angeletos, George-Marios ;
Pavan, Alessandro .
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2009, 7 (01) :11-60
[9]   The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy [J].
Athey, S ;
Atkeson, A ;
Kehoe, PJ .
ECONOMETRICA, 2005, 73 (05) :1431-1475
[10]   A POSITIVE THEORY OF MONETARY-POLICY IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL [J].
BARRO, RJ ;
GORDON, DB .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (04) :589-610