t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments

被引:2
作者
Kazumori, Eiichiro [1 ]
Belch, Yaakov
机构
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 日本学术振兴会;
关键词
Experiments; Software; Combinatorial auctions; SPECTRUM AUCTION; ASCENDING PRICES; ELICITATION; ALLOCATION; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbef.2019.100235
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper provides a brief introduction to t-Tree, a general auction software package that implements single-unit auctions, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions ("VCG auctions"), Simultaneous Multiple Round Auctions ("SMRA"), and Combinatorial Clock Auctions ("CCA") used in transportation, logistics, procurements, and spectrum allocation. The critical contribution of t-Tree is that it can handle computational complexities of the winner determination problem in large-scale combinatorial auctions by natively implementing Zhong et al. (2004)'s combinatorial optimization algorithms. Thus researchers can study large-scale combinatorial auction mechanisms off the shelf using t-Tree. (c) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页数:7
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