Study on Related Party Transactions and Decision-Making Behavior of Controlling Shareholder based on SPSS Software Technology

被引:0
作者
Xu, Bo [1 ]
Li, Kai [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeastern Univ, Sch Business Adm, Shenyang 110819, Peoples R China
来源
COMPUTER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 2014年 / 519-520卷
关键词
Related-party transaction; Decision-making behavior of controlling shareholder; SPSS software regression technology; Metal and nonmetal enterprises;
D O I
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.519-520.1560
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This paper uses SPSS software regression technology to analyze whether controlling shareholder employs related-party transaction to damage the performance of enterprises. The study selects samples in Chinese metal and nonmetal enterprise. We find that the enterprises with controlling shareholders have more related party transactions. The enterprises with president coming from controlling shareholder have more related party transactions than the enterprises with president coming from non-controlling shareholders. We also find the more the number of independent director, the less the number of related party transactions. The result suggests that related party transactions have close relationship with controlling shareholders. If the enterprise have concentrated ownership, the probability of the largest shareholder pursuing more benefit from tunneling activities will be greater.
引用
收藏
页码:1560 / 1563
页数:4
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