Payoff-dependence learning ability resolves social dilemmas

Understanding the appearance and maintenance of cooperation behavior is one of the most interesting challenges in natural and social sciences. Evolutionary game is a useful tool to study this issue. Here, we consider a basic strategy updating rule: the probability of a player updating its strategy is affected by the learning ability, which is determined by payoffs and an aspiration parameter w. For positive w, learning ability is directly proportional to player's own payoff. When w equals 0, it returns to traditional situation. It is found that increasing the value of w can promote the cooperation. With the increase of w, the player's learning ability is continuously enhanced, and the probability of changing strategies is also increased. This paper verifies the influence of the introduced selection parameter w on the cooperation rate from different aspects. We tested this hypothesis through the Monte Carlo simulation, and demonstrated that introducing w changed the network of interaction effectively, therefore changing the effect of the adoption of the strategy on the uncertainty of cooperation evolution. This paper analyzed the results of the payoff-dependence learning ability of different players when they imitate the strategies of their opponents, which can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation.