Moral hazard with the (unlikely) possibility of catastrophes

被引：1

作者：

Bednarek, Ziemowit ^{[1
]}

Patel, Pratish ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Calif Polytech State Univ San Luis Obispo, Orfalea Coll Business, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 124卷 / 03期

关键词：

Moral hazard; Cumulants; Rare disasters; Optimal contract; Skewness;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.035

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Without sacrificing tractability, we analyze the effect of fat-tailed events such as catastrophes on the optimal compensation contract between a principal and an agent. The optimal contract depends on all the moments and not just the variance. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：386 / 388

页数：3