Evolutionary Game Analysis and Computer Simulation of Iron Ore Price Negotiation

被引：0
作者：
Zhang, Yun [1 ]
He, Qing [1 ]
机构：
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF 2013 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (ICIII 2013) VOL 1 | 2013年
关键词：
component; Chinese steel enterprises; iron ore price negotiation; evolutionary game; computer simulation;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号：
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要：
The paper established an evolutionary game to analyze the international iron ore price negotiations which the Chinese steel enterprises participated under the rationality assumptions of negotiation parties. The results showed that the interest improved in the price negotiations between the steel enterprises and the iron ore enterprises is related to the additional income from both the steel enterprises and iron ore enterprises compromise, and the betrayal revenue for the party who choose the non-compromise strategy while the other party select the compromise strategy. Next, we simulate the evolutionary game using the matlab7.10 and find that the larger the distribution coefficient of additional income of the steel enterprise or the iron ore enterprises is, the faster the enterprise chooses the compromise strategy. Finally, we suggest some reasonable iron ore negotiation strategies to provide Chinese steel enterprises with a theoretical basis.
引用
收藏
页码：409 / 412
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Strategy analysis of an evolutionary spectrum sensing game
    Ding, Dongsheng
    Zhang, Guoyue
    Qi, Donglian
    Zhang, Huhu
    Communications in Computer and Information Science, 2014, 462 : 129 - 139
  • [32] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Conventionality Mass Emergency
    Wei, Yupin
    Dong, Yuqing
    Wang, Weiguo
    Liu, Dehai
    INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 2009 (ISEM'09), 2009, : 102 - 105
  • [33] "Innovation or no"- The business dilemma with Evolutionary Game Analysis
    Tang, Ling
    2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING (MSE 2010), VOL 3, 2010, : 193 - 197
  • [34] Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Strategy of Enterprises
    Lu Fang-yuan
    Jiao Ke-yan
    CCDC 2009: 21ST CHINESE CONTROL AND DECISION CONFERENCE, VOLS 1-6, PROCEEDINGS, 2009, : 4499 - +
  • [35] Analysis of Evolutionary Game Theory Based on FTW
    Yang Luming
    Wang Debin
    INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS (SSME 2015), 2015, : 596 - 602
  • [36] Strategy Analysis of an Evolutionary Spectrum Sensing Game
    Ding, Dongsheng
    Zhang, Guoyue
    Qi, Donglian
    Zhang, Huhu
    COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, NETWORKED SYSTEMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS, 2014, 462 : 129 - 139
  • [37] Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Healthcare Fraud Supervision under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism
    Zhu, Change
    Zhou, Lulin
    Zhang, Xinjie
    Walsh, Christine A.
    HEALTHCARE, 2023, 11 (13)
  • [38] Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game
    Chu, Zhaopeng
    Bian, Chen
    Yang, Jun
    PROBLEMY EKOROZWOJU, 2022, 17 (01): : 222 - 233
  • [39] Evolutionary game simulation on failure knowledge sharing among chemical enterprises
    Xiong, Zhuang
    Ye, Jianmu
    Wang, Pengju
    Yin, Zongyi
    CHIMICA OGGI-CHEMISTRY TODAY, 2016, 34 (6B) : 13 - 19
  • [40] The Evolutionary-Game-Theory-Based Analysis of the Enterprise and Government Innovation Game
    Luo Yafei
    Meng Qingliang
    RECENT ADVANCE IN STATISTICS APPLICATION AND RELATED AREAS, VOLS I AND II, 2009, : 1223 - 1232
12345