Strategic Private Experimentation

被引：17

作者：

Felgenhauer, Mike ^{[1
]}

Schulte, Elisabeth ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, Devon, England

[2] Univ Marburg, Marburg Ctr Inst Econ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, D-35037 Marburg, Germany

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2014年 / 6卷 / 04期

关键词：

INFORMATION; PERSUASION; DISCLOSURE;

D O I：

10.1257/mic.6.4.74

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high

引用

页码：74 / 105

页数：32

共 30 条

[1] OPTIMAL LEARNING BY EXPERIMENTATION [J].