Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

被引：35

作者：

Alcalde, J ^{[1
]}

Revilla, P

机构：

[1] Univ Alicante, Dept FOnaments Anal Econ, E-03071 Alicante, Spain

[2] Pablo Olavide Univ Seville, Ctr A, E-41013 Seville, Spain

[3] Pablo Olavide Univ Seville, Dept Econ, E-41013 Seville, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 40卷 / 08期

关键词：

coalition formation; research teams configurations; stability; strategy-proofness;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent depend on the set of researchers who are collaborating. We introduce a property over researchers' preferences, called top responsiveness, guaranteeing the existence of stable research teams configurations. We also provide a stable mechanism, induced by the so-called top covering algorithm, which is strategy-proof when researchers preferences satisfy top responsiveness. Furthermore, we find that, in this framework, the top covering mechanism is the only strategy-proof mechanism that always selects stable allocations. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：869 / 887

页数：19