The myth of profit-shifting trade policies

被引:2
作者
Koska, Onur A. [1 ]
Staehler, Frank [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Middle E Tech Univ, Dept Econ, Univ Mah Dumlupmar Blv 1, TR-06800 Ankara, Turkey
[2] Univ Tubingen, Dept Econ, Mohlstr 36 V4, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany
[3] Univ Adelaide, Dept Econ, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
[4] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Import tariffs; Export subsidies; Profit shifting;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.024
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Since Dixit (1984), it is well accepted that a home country's best policy is to ban imports in an oligopolistic market if the resulting monopoly has a cost advantage over imports. This note (i) provides a formal proof and (ii) extends this result to symmetric firms. When domestic instruments are available, the optimal policy in a non-cooperative game is to subsidize local production such that it completely replaces imports. This policy is also globally first-best. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 41
页数:3
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