Capacity competition of make-to-order firms

被引：32

作者：

Chen, H

Wan, YW

机构：

[1] Cheung Kong Grad Sch Business, Beijing 100738, Peoples R China

[2] Natl Dong Hwa Univ, Grad Inst Global Operat Strategy & Logist Managem, Hualien, Taiwan

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2005年 / 33卷 / 02期

关键词：

capacity competition; make-to-order firms; long-run duopoly; Nash equilibrium; time and price competition;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2002.08.001

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Two make-to-order firms, each modelled as a single-server queue, compete for a common stream of (potential) customers by setting their service capacities (rates) and service prices. Each customer maximizes her expected return by getting service from a firm or by balking. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the competition. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：187 / 194

页数：8

共 23 条

[1] INDIVIDUAL VERSUS SOCIAL OPTIMIZATION IN THE ALLOCATION OF CUSTOMERS TO ALTERNATIVE SERVERS [J].