Network connections, CEO compensation and involuntary turnover: The impact of a friend of a friend

被引：36

作者：

Balsam, Steven ^{[1
]}

Kwack, So Yean ^{[2
]}

Lee, Jae Young ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Temple Univ, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA

[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Yonsei Univ, Seoul, South Korea

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2017年 / 45卷

关键词：

CEO compensation; CEO turnover; Connections; Indirect connections; Direct connections; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FORMER CEOS; BOARDS; DIRECTORS; DETERMINANT; INCENTIVES; SUCCESSION; RETENTION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We show that hard to observe, indirect connections between a CEO and "independent" board members are associated with higher CEO compensation. While we find this result for the "friend of a friend" connection, we do not find it for direct connections, i.e. friends sitting on the board. We postulate that this differential result is caused by directors with readily observable connections to the CEO being wary of provoking outrage. In contrast we find both types of connections associated with reduced involuntary CEO turnover, suggesting that outrage is not as big a concern, e.g., compensation is the foci of stakeholders. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：220 / 244

页数：25

共 49 条

[1] The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey [J].