Cross ownership and divestment incentives

被引：9

作者：

Stenbacka, Rune ^{[1
,2
]}

Van Moer, Geert ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Hanken Sch Econ, POB 479, Helsinki 00101, Finland

[2] Helsinki Grad Sch Econ, POB 479, Helsinki 00101, Finland

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2021年 / 201卷

关键词：

Cross ownership; Divestment incentives;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109748

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Even though cross ownership raises industry profits, we demonstrate that it is prone to a commitment problem. Specifically, we show that producers in a Cournot duopoly have unilateral incentives to resell their minority share-holdings in the rival to outside investors, leading to an equilibrium with complete divestments. This feature challenges the stability of cross ownership configurations.(c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页数：4

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