Escaping the Disengagement Dilemma: Two Field Experiments on Motivating Citizens to Report on Public Services

被引:10
作者
Buntaine, Mark T. [1 ]
Nielson, Daniel L. [2 ]
Skaggs, Jacob T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Bren Sch Environm Sci & Management, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Brigham Young Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Provo, UT 84602 USA
关键词
responsiveness; governance; ICT; participation; public services; solid waste; nominations; field experiments; SOLID-WASTE MANAGEMENT; GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS; SYMBOLIC AWARDS; PARTICIPATION; NETWORKS; MODELS;
D O I
10.1017/S0007123419000322
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
To promote good governance, citizens can inform governments directly and routinely about the implementation of policies and the delivery of public services. Yet citizens lack incentives to provide information when they do not expect governments to be responsive, and citizen disengagement in turn often prevents governments from providing public goods effectively. In two field experiments, we studied potential remedies to this dilemma related to solid waste services in Uganda. We randomly assigned reporters to be recruited by community nomination and to be recognized by community leaders in an attempt to select for and motivate information sharing. We also randomly assigned reporters to hear from the government about how their reports were used to make real improvements to waste services. Community nominations and public announcements did not increase reporting. However, responsiveness boosted participation over several months for reporters who had been recruited earliest and had been reporting longest, highlighting the critical role of timely government responsiveness in sustaining information flows from citizens.
引用
收藏
页码:685 / 705
页数:21
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