Suspense and Surprise

被引：161

作者：

Ely, Jeffrey ^{[1
]}

Frankel, Alexander ^{[2
]}

Kamenica, Emir ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2015年 / 123卷 / 01期

关键词：

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE; ANTICIPATORY FEELINGS; BOUNDED MARTINGALE; MAXIMAL VARIATION; UNCERTAINTY; RESOLUTION; CURIOSITY; MARKETS;

D O I：

10.1086/677350

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period's beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.

引用

页码：215 / 260

页数：46

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