Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets

被引：74
作者：
Sonmez, T
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1997年 / 77卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2316
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study manipulation of solutions by hospitals via underreporting their capacities in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match medical interns and hospitals in United States is manipulable in this way. Our main result is that there is no solution that is stable and non-manipulable ria capacities. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码：197 / 204
页数：8
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