The empirical study of norms is just what we are missing

被引：6

作者：

Achourioti, Theodora ^{[1
]}

Fugard, Andrew J. B. ^{[2
]}

Stenning, Keith ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Amsterdam, Inst Log Language & Computat, Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] UCL, Dept Clin Educ & Hlth Psychol, London WC1H 0AP, England

[3] Univ Giessen, Dept Psychol, D-35390 Giessen, Germany

来源：

FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY | 2014年 / 5卷

关键词：

reasoning goals; normativity; reasoning norms; syllogisms; classical logic; nonmonotonic reasoning; probabilistic reasoning; heterogeneity of human reasoning; MENTAL MODELS; CONDITIONALS; PROBABILITY; LOGIC; DEDUCTION; INFERENCE; FINETTI;

D O I：

10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01159

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

This paper argues that the goals people have when reasoning determine their own norms of reasoning. A radical descriptivism which avoids norms never worked for any science; nor can it work for the psychology of reasoning. Norms as we understand them are illustrated with examples from categorical syllogistic reasoning and the "new paradigm" of subjective probabilities. We argue that many formal systems are required for psychology: classical logic, non-monotonic logics, probability logics, relevance logic, and others. One of the hardest challenges is working out what goals reasoners have and choosing and tailoring the appropriate logics to model the norms those goals imply.

引用

页数：15