A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions

Drawing on the so-called 'doctrinal paradox', List and Pettit, [Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002) 89-110] have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow's theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a possibility result, similar in spirit to Black's median voter theorem [Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948) 23-34]. Specifically, I prove that, given unidimensional alignment, propositionwise majority voting is the unique procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments into collective ones in accordance with the above mentioned minimal conditions. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.