THE GAMBLING ANALYSIS ON CREDIT RISK OF BANK IN INVESTIGATION STAGE WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - US SUB-PRIME CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKS' INVESTIGATION STAGE

被引：0

作者：

Ye Shu-jun ^{[1
]}

Meng Qian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

DCABES 2009: THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING AND APPLICATIONS TO BUSINESS, ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE, PROCEEDINGS | 2009年

关键词：

Credit risk; Game theory; Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; US sub-prime crisis;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Information asymmetry is the reason for the risks of adverse selection in banks' investigation stage. This paper establishes a gambling model to analysis the risk of adverse selection, pointing out that banks in investigation stage can not use the probability of review raised as a solution to asymmetric information. The banks can get more information to improve the efficiency of the review, but the existing mortgage loans did not improve efficiency. Only setting up a system to enhance the information exchange can prevent the risk of adverse selection effectively. Ignoring the investigation and over-emphasising on loan collateral are the reasons for US sub-prime crisis, which is a warning to the loan security of China's bank.

引用

页码：441 / 443

页数：3