Leading for the long term

被引:37
作者
Hermalin, Benjamin E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Walter A Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
leadership; signaling in repeated games;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
How do leaders build credibility, and what happens if they can't or don't'? Existing economic models of leadership consider static settings only and, thus, are not well-suited for addressing Such issues. Moreover, an important phenomenon of leadership is its persistence. To allow for credibility and other behaviors that make sense only in repeated games (such as the followers' paying the leader tribute), this paper considers a repeated-game version of (Hermalin, B.E., 1998. Toward in economic theory of leadership: leading by example. American Economic Review 88, 1188-1206) leadership model. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 19
页数:19
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