Do public schools hire the best applicants?

被引:112
作者
Ballou, D
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2946659
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Despite a surplus of candidates for most teaching jobs, a strong academic record does little for an applicant's job prospects. This does not appear to result from lukewarm interest on the part of such applicants or choosiness about the positions they accept. Administrators' lack of interest in these candidates may reflect the weakness of competitive pressures in public education. Policies intended to improve teacher quality need to consider incentives on both the demand and supply sides of the market.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 133
页数:37
相关论文
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