Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

被引:38
|
作者
Kallestrup, Jesper [1 ]
Pritchard, Duncan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Edinburgh, Sch Philosophy Psychol & Language Sci, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland
基金
美国国家航空航天局;
关键词
KNOWLEDGE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00495.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
A popular form of virtue epistemologydefended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Grecoholds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.
引用
收藏
页码:335 / 357
页数:23
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