Late marriage and transition from arranged marriages to love matches: A search-theoretic approach

被引:2
作者
Kezuka, Kazuhiro [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
关键词
Mate selection; arranged marriage; individualism; late marriage; evolution of preferences; markov decision process; PREFERENCES; SELECTION; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1080/0022250X.2017.1416371
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The aim of this study is to explore the mechanism behind how the spread of individualism, the prevalence of love matches, and the increase in search costs affect late marriages in Japan. To this end, I construct a search-theoretic model, which is a combination of the Markov decision process and the evolution of preferences. I present three results. 1) The spread of individualism is driven by those who moderately consider the social status of their family. 2) The spread of individualism and the prevalence of love matches delay the average marriage timing, but its effect is limited. 3) The diversity of individualism prevents people from switching from love matches to arranged marriages, while the search costs are rising.
引用
收藏
页码:237 / 256
页数:20
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