Investment in energy efficiency: Do the characteristics of firms matter?

被引:173
作者
DeCanio, SJ [1 ]
Watkins, WE [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003465398557366
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted. Yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment, profit-maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value. The standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class, and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm. This model as applied to energy-saving investments is tested by examining whether firms' characteristics influence their decision to join the Environmental Protection Agency's voluntary Green Lights program. A discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms. Missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation-maximization algorithm. The results show that (1) substantial improvements in the power of hypothesis tests can be achieved through maximum-likelihood imputation of missing data, and (2) contrary to the conventional theory, the characteristics of firms do affect their decision to join Green Lights and commit to a program of investments in lighting efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:95 / 107
页数:13
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