Underpricing of IPOs: Firm-, issue- and country-specific characteristics

被引:115
作者
Engelen, Peter-Jan [1 ]
van Essen, Marc [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utrecht, Sch Econ, Utrecht, Netherlands
[2] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam Sch Management, Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
IPO; Underpricing; Legal framework; Investor protection; Multi-level modeling; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR PROTECTION; ADVERSE-SELECTION; AGENCY CONFLICTS; PERFORMANCE; SECURITIES; BANKING; LEGAL; PRICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using a large firm-level dataset of 2920 IPOs from 21 countries we examine the impact of country-level institutional characteristics on the underpricing of IPOs. Through hierarchical linear modeling we are able to control for firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics and test whether country-specific institutional characteristics add explanatory power to explain the level of underpricing. Our results show that about 10% of the variation in the level of underpricing is between countries. The quality of a country's legal framework, as measured by its level of investor protection, the overall quality of its legal system and its level of legal enforcement, reduces the level of underpricing significantly. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1958 / 1969
页数:12
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