Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making

被引：0

作者：

Zimper, Alexander ^{[1
]}

Nicholls, Nicky ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pretoria, Dept Econ, Private Bag X20, ZA-0028 Pretoria, South Africa

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY | 2020年 / 22卷 / 01期

关键词：

fairness; identity; in-group bias; trust game; FAIRNESS; DISCRIMINATION; RECIPROCITY;

D O I：

10.1111/jpet.12405

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade-off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame-perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk-neutral and risk-averse agent, respectively.

引用

页码：220 / 244

页数：25

共 27 条

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