Evolutionary dynamics of collective index insurance

被引:7
作者
Pacheco, Jorge M. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Santos, Francisco C. [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Levin, Simon A. [6 ,7 ,8 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minho, Ctr Biol Mol & Ambiental, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal
[2] Univ Minho, Dept Matemat & Aplicacoes, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal
[3] ATP Grp, P-1649003 Lisbon, Portugal
[4] Univ Lisbon, INESC ID, IST Tagusparque, P-2744016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
[5] Univ Lisbon, Inst Super Tecn, IST Tagusparque, P-2744016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
[6] Princeton Univ, Dept Ecol & Evolutionary Biol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[7] Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[8] Beijer Inst Ecol Econ, POB 50005, S-10405 Stockholm, Sweden
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Index insurance; Collective action; Evolutionary game theory; Non-linear returns; RAINFALL INSURANCE; RISK;
D O I
10.1007/s00285-015-0939-3
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Index-based insurances offer promising opportunities for climate-risk investments in developing countries. Indeed, contracts conditional on, e.g., weather or livestock indexes can be cheaper to set up than conventional indemnity-based insurances, while offering a safety net to vulnerable households, allowing them to eventually escape poverty traps. Moreover, transaction costs by insurance companies may be additionally reduced if contracts, instead of arranged with single households, are endorsed by collectives of households that bear the responsibility of managing the division of the insurance coverage by its members whenever the index is surpassed, allowing for additional flexibility in what concerns risk-sharing and also allowing insurance companies to avoid the costs associated with moral hazard. Here we resort to a population dynamics framework to investigate under which conditions household collectives may find collective index insurances attractive, when compared with individual index insurances. We assume risk sharing among the participants of each collective, and model collective action in terms of an N-person threshold game. Compared to less affordable individual index insurances, we show how collective index insurances lead to a coordination problem in which the adoption of index insurances may become the optimal decision, spreading index insurance coverage to the entire population. We further investigate the role of risk-averse and risk-prone behaviors, as well as the role of partial correlation between insurance coverage and actual loss of crops, and in which way these affect the original coordination thresholds.
引用
收藏
页码:997 / 1010
页数:14
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