A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money

被引:46
作者
Coles, MG [1 ]
Wright, R
机构
[1] Univ Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
[2] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Barcelona, Spain
[3] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:32 / 54
页数:23
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