The impact of institutional investors on mergers and acquisitions in the United Kingdom

被引：57

作者：

Andriosopoulos, Dimitris ^{[1
]}

Yang, Shuai ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Strathclyde, Sch Business, Dept Accounting & Finance, Glasgow G4 0LN, Lanark, Scotland

[2] Nankai Univ, Sch Business, China Acad Corp Governance, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2015年 / 50卷

关键词：

Institutional investors; Mergers and acquisitions; Cross-border; Investment horizon; Endogeneity; Financial crisis; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; DOMESTIC INVESTORS; FOREIGN OWNERSHIP; CULTURAL DISTANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; MARKET; INFORMATION; PERFORMANCE; EXPERIENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we investigate the impact of institutional ownership on UK mergers and acquisitions. We employ a comprehensive sample of M&As conducted by UK acquirers from 2000 to 2010, thus including a full cycle of peak and trough in M&A waves. We find that institutional investors increase the likelihood of an M&A to be a large, cross-border deal, opting for full control. Moreover, institutional ownership concentration and foreign institutional ownership increase the likelihood of cross-border M&As. In addition, we assess the influence of institutional shareholders' investment horizon and find that while investment horizon have a negative influence in encouraging cross-border M&As, the presence of long-term investors encourages larger M&As. Finally, even after controlling for the 2007-08 financial crisis the market reacts negatively to the announcement of cross-border M&As. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：547 / 561

页数：15

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