Games with an endogenous sharing rule;
Discontinuous games;
Equilibrium;
Invariance;
DISCONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GAMES;
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION;
NASH EQUILIBRIUM;
EXISTENCE;
AUCTIONS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.011
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We consider games with an endogenous sharing rule and provide conditions for the invariance of the equilibrium set, i.e., for the existence of a common equilibrium set for the games defined by each possible sharing rule. Applications of our results include Bertrand competition with convex costs, electoral competition, and contests. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, Paris Sch Econ, Ctr Econ Sorbonne, UMR 8174, Paris, FranceUniv Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, Paris Sch Econ, Ctr Econ Sorbonne, UMR 8174, Paris, France
机构:
Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USAUniv Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
Barelli, Paulo
Duggan, John
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
Univ Rochester, Dept Polit Sci, Rochester, NY 14627 USAUniv Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
机构:
Emory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USAEmory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
Allison, Blake A.
Lepore, Jason J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Calif Polytech State Univ San Luis Obispo, Orfalea Coll Business, Dept Econ, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 USAEmory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA