Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability

被引:0
作者
Ramaswamy, Vinod [1 ]
Paccagnan, Dario [2 ]
Marden, Jason R. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Dept Elect Comp & Energy Engn, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[2] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Automat Control Lab, Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
来源
2019 18TH EUROPEAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ECC) | 2019年
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
NETWORK; DESIGN; PRICE;
D O I
10.23919/ecc.2019.8795936
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Networked systems are ubiquitous in today's world with examples spanning from ecology to the social and engineering sciences. Much of the research in networked systems is analytical, where the focus is on characterizing (and potentially influencing) the emergent collective behavior. A more recent trend of research focuses on the design of networked systems capable of achieving diverse and highly coordinated collective behavior in the absence of centralized control. Focusing on the well-studied class of maximum coverage problems, our first result demonstrates that any agent-based algorithm relying solely on local information induces a fundamental trade-off between the best and worst case performance guarantees, as measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability. Our second results demonstrates how to use an additional piece of system-level information to breach these limitations, thereby improving the system's performance.
引用
收藏
页码:1043 / 1048
页数:6
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