Redevelopment, San Diego Style: The Limits of Public-Private Partnerships

被引:32
作者
Erie, Steven P. [1 ]
Kogan, Vladimir [2 ,3 ]
MacKenzie, Scott A. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Urban Studies & Planning Program, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Polit Sci, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Bill Lane Ctr Amer W, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Univ Calif Davis, Davis, CA 95616 USA
关键词
agency theory; San Diego; public private partnerships; redevelopment; sports stadiums; urban politics; POLITICS; SPORTS; CITY;
D O I
10.1177/1078087409359760
中图分类号
TU98 [区域规划、城乡规划];
学科分类号
0814 ; 082803 ; 0833 ;
摘要
Fiscally strapped local governments have increasingly turned to public-private partnerships (P3s) for redevelopment assistance, empowering private actors to exercise functions typically performed by the public sector. While P3s can enhance project funding and completion, they create the possibility of agency loss, that is, public means-tax dollars, public powers, and other resources- being diverted toward private purposes. Using a principal-agent approach, the authors examine an ambitious and widely heralded P3 in San Diego to build a downtown ballpark and encourage private investment in surrounding neighborhoods. The authors identify a set of political, institutional, and partnership conditions exacerbating agency loss and thwarting redevelopment's public mission.
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页码:644 / 678
页数:35
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