Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War

被引:26
|
作者
Dylan, Huw [1 ,2 ]
Maguire, Thomas J. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Kings Coll London, Dept War Studies, Intelligence & Int Secur, London, England
[2] Norwegian Intelligence Sch, Ctr Intelligence Studies, Oslo, Norway
[3] Leiden Univ, Intelligence & Secur, Inst Secur & Global Affairs, Leiden, Netherlands
[4] Kings Coll London, Kings Intelligence & Secur Grp, Dept War Studies, London, England
关键词
Russia; Ukraine; Vladimir Putin; intelligence; intelligence-led communications; disinformation; false-flag operations; cyber security; open-source intelligence (OSINT); CIA; GCHQ; Cuban Missile Crisis;
D O I
10.1080/00396338.2022.2103257
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures represent a significant evolutionary step in how liberal-democratic governments use their intelligence assets, current practice has built upon historical precedents. This article examines why states choose to use intelligence - including fabricated intelligence - for influencing external audiences; the different methods they deploy for doing so; the gains and costs of publicising intelligence; and how the use of intelligence during the Russia-Ukraine conflict should be understood within broader historical and contemporary trends. The authors conclude that while liberal democracies' use of intelligence in public is to be welcomed for its greater transparency, careful risk management will be needed if this approach is to continue.
引用
收藏
页码:33 / 74
页数:42
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] War crimes in Ukraine: is Putin responsible?
    Bufacchi, Vittorio
    JOURNAL OF POLITICAL POWER, 2023, 16 (01) : 1 - 6
  • [42] Russia's war goals in Ukraine
    Marples, David R.
    CANADIAN SLAVONIC PAPERS, 2022, 64 (2-3) : 207 - 219
  • [43] Ukraine and the New Economic Cold War
    Hudson, Michael
    International Critical Thought, 2016, 6 (04) : 556 - 569
  • [44] Russians' Attitudes Towards the War in Ukraine
    Wollast, Robin
    Phillips, Joseph B.
    Yahiiaiev, Illia
    Malysheva, Karine
    Klein, Olivier
    Sengupta, Nikhil K.
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2025, 55 (01) : 119 - 135
  • [45] China's Response to War in Ukraine
    Greitens, Sheena Chestnut
    ASIAN SURVEY, 2022, 62 (5-6) : 751 - 781
  • [46] Hybrid War in Ukraine: What is Next?
    Konoplyov, Sergei
    Urbanskiy, Alexander
    COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UKRAINE, 2016, 128 : 96 - 101
  • [47] War, diplomacy, and more war: why did the Minsk agreements fail?
    Atland, Kristian
    INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 2024,
  • [48] Belarus, Russia, Ukraine: Three Lessons for a Post-war Order
    Gould-Davies, Nigel
    SURVIVAL, 2022, 64 (05) : 39 - 46
  • [49] Perceptions of the war in Ukraine: how the Russian propaganda works outside the west
    Irrera, Daniela
    Bilgic, Ali
    EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2025, 24 (01) : 66 - 73
  • [50] Unfair Competition: How States Use Disinformation to Exercise Public Diplomacy
    Luis Manfredi, Juan
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 2024, 18 : 1426 - 1448