Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War

被引:26
|
作者
Dylan, Huw [1 ,2 ]
Maguire, Thomas J. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Kings Coll London, Dept War Studies, Intelligence & Int Secur, London, England
[2] Norwegian Intelligence Sch, Ctr Intelligence Studies, Oslo, Norway
[3] Leiden Univ, Intelligence & Secur, Inst Secur & Global Affairs, Leiden, Netherlands
[4] Kings Coll London, Kings Intelligence & Secur Grp, Dept War Studies, London, England
关键词
Russia; Ukraine; Vladimir Putin; intelligence; intelligence-led communications; disinformation; false-flag operations; cyber security; open-source intelligence (OSINT); CIA; GCHQ; Cuban Missile Crisis;
D O I
10.1080/00396338.2022.2103257
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures represent a significant evolutionary step in how liberal-democratic governments use their intelligence assets, current practice has built upon historical precedents. This article examines why states choose to use intelligence - including fabricated intelligence - for influencing external audiences; the different methods they deploy for doing so; the gains and costs of publicising intelligence; and how the use of intelligence during the Russia-Ukraine conflict should be understood within broader historical and contemporary trends. The authors conclude that while liberal democracies' use of intelligence in public is to be welcomed for its greater transparency, careful risk management will be needed if this approach is to continue.
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页码:33 / 74
页数:42
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