The impact of simultaneous holdings of equity and debt on financial covenants in debt contracts

被引:0
作者
Lee, Sungsil [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Louisiana Lafayette, Dept Accounting, BI Moody III Coll Business Adm, Lafayette, LA 70504 USA
关键词
Institutional investor; Conflicts of interest; Debt covenants; Syndicated loan; INVESTMENT; OPPORTUNITIES; DETERMINANTS; SHAREHOLDERS; MANAGEMENT; AGENCY; FIRM;
D O I
10.1108/JFRA-06-2020-0153
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of non-commercial banking institutions' simultaneous holdings of equity and debt in the same firm (hereafter, dual holdings) on financial covenants in debt contracts. Design/methodology/approach By using the DealScan database, this study tests how dual holdings affect the number of financial debt covenants. Findings This study finds that the presence of dual holders is positively associated with the number of financial covenants in general, suggesting that the use of financial covenants is reduced when the interests between shareholders and creditors are aligned. This study also finds that dual holder participation does not reduce the number of financial covenants in leveraged loans as much as it does in investment-grade loans. Additionally, when a dual holder has a large portion of equity stakes and loan claims in a borrowing firm, the effect of dual holdings on financial covenants is more pronounced. Originality/value This study contributes to debt market research by showing that dual holder participation reduces the number of financial covenants in debt contracts.
引用
收藏
页码:921 / 938
页数:18
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