Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa: Examining the moderating role of political institutions

被引:23
作者
Agoba, Abel Mawuko [1 ,2 ]
Abor, Joshua Yindenaba [1 ]
Osei, Kofi [1 ]
Sa-Aadu, Jarjisu [3 ]
Amoah, Benjamin [4 ]
Dzeha, Gloria Clarissa Odortor [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ghana, Dept Finance, Legon, Ghana
[2] Cent Univ, Dept Banking & Finance, Accra, Ghana
[3] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA USA
[4] Cent Univ, Accra, Ghana
关键词
Africa; Developing countries; Institutional theory; BUSINESS CYCLES; BUDGET CYCLES; VETO PLAYERS; MONETARY; CORRUPTION; TRANSPARENCY; CREDIBILITY; DEMOCRACY; GROWTH; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970-2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Findings The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI's effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Practical implications The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years. Originality/value The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain government spending. It also compares findings in Africa to other developing countries, noting some differences.
引用
收藏
页码:809 / 830
页数:22
相关论文
共 60 条
[1]   Opportunistic political cycles: Test in a young democracy setting [J].
Akhmedov, A ;
Zhuravskaya, E .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2004, 119 (04) :1301-1338
[2]   Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries [J].
Alt, James E. ;
Lassen, David Dreyer .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2006, 50 (03) :530-550
[3]  
Ames B., 1987, POLITICAL SURVIVAL P
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2017, WORLD DEV INDICATORS, DOI 10.1596/26447
[5]  
[Anonymous], W14033 NAT BUR EC RE
[6]   BUDGET DEFICITS, MONEY GROWTH AND CAUSALITY - FURTHER OECD EVIDENCE [J].
BARNHART, SW ;
DARRAT, AF .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE, 1988, 7 (02) :231-242
[7]   Blunt Instruments: Avoiding Common Pitfalls in Identifying the Causes of Economic Growth [J].
Bazzi, Samuel ;
Clemens, Michael A. .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS, 2013, 5 (02) :152-186
[8]  
Beck N., 2004, ANN M SOC POL METH S
[9]  
Bodea C., 2015, BRIT J POLIT SCI, V46, P215
[10]   Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending? [J].
Bodea, Cristina ;
Higashijima, Masaaki .
BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2017, 47 (01) :47-70