International trade, the gender wage gap and female labor force participation

被引:52
作者
Saure, Philip [1 ]
Zoabi, Hosny [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Swiss Natl Bank, CH-8022 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] New Econ Sch, Moscow, Russia
[3] New Econ Sch, Urals Business Ctr, Moscow, Russia
关键词
Female labor force participation; Gender wage gap; Home production; NAFTA; WOMENS RELATIVE WAGES; INEQUALITY; GROWTH; SPECIALIZATION; LIBERATION; DYNAMICS; ENGINES; MARKET; IMPACT; POWER;
D O I
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.07.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recent work in gender economics has identified trade as a potential determinant of female labor force participation (REP). It is usually suggested that FLFP rises whenever trade expands those sectors which use female labor intensively. This paper develops a theoretical model to argue that, quite surprisingly, the opposite effects can occur. Distinguishing between female intensive sectors (FIS) and male intensive sectors (MIS), we show that FLFP may actually fall if trade expands EIS. When FIS are capital intensive, trade integration of a capital-abundant economy expands FIS and contracts MIS. Consequently, male workers migrate from MIS to FIS, diluting the capital-labor ratio in the FIS. Under a high complementarity between capital and female labor, the marginal productivity of women drops more than that of men. Thus, the gender wage gap widens and FLFP falls. Employment patterns in the U.S. following NAFTA are broadly consistent with our theory. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 33
页数:17
相关论文
共 47 条
[1]   Women, war, and wages: The effect of female labor supply on the wage structure at midcentury [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Autor, DH ;
Lyle, D .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2004, 112 (03) :497-551
[2]  
Aguayo-Tellez Ernesto, 2010, 16195 NBER
[3]  
Angrist JD, 1998, AM ECON REV, V88, P450
[4]  
[Anonymous], W11040 NBER
[5]  
[Anonymous], 1999, HDB LABOR EC
[6]  
[Anonymous], 1999, 7429 NBER
[7]  
Autor D., 2012, 18054 NBER
[8]  
Bacolod MP, 2010, J HUM RESOUR, V45, P197
[9]  
Bailey MJ, 2006, Q J ECON, V121, P289
[10]  
Becker Gary S., 2010, EC DISCRIMINATION