Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions

被引：0

作者：

Tomiyama, Hideyuki ^{[1
]}

Otsu, Taisuke ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA USA

[2] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, England

[3] Keio Econ Observ KEO, 2-15-45 Mita,Minato Ku, Tokyo 1088345, Japan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2022年 / 215卷

关键词：

Multiple equilibria; Partial identification; Moment inequalities;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110440

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

By extending de Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2016), we derive testable restrictions for uniqueness of equilibrium in games with multi-dimensional actions. We discuss two models of payoff functions which imply certain covariance restrictions for players' actions. These restrictions can be used to construct an identified set of strategic parameters under multiple equilibria. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：4

共 4 条

[1] Inference Based on Conditional Moment Inequalities [J].