The effect of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

被引:6
作者
Uri, ND [1 ]
机构
[1] FCC, Wire Line Competit Bur, Pricing Policy Div, Washington, DC 20554 USA
关键词
data envelop analysis; incentive regulation; local exchange carrier; technical efficiency;
D O I
10.1023/A:1023305426380
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The issue explored here is whether incentive regulation has resulted in an increase in productive efficiency. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, one methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency is reviewed. This methodology is data envelopment analysis (DEA) and allows for the measurement of both scale efficiency and technical efficiency of individual local exchange carriers. The results indicate that most local exchange carriers were technically efficient over the 1988-1998 period. Four LECs, however, consistently demonstrate scale inefficiency. In the aggregate, however, based on the DEA results there was no identifiable improvement in aggregate LECs' technical efficiency between 1988 and 1998. Subsequently, an alternative methodology, a stochastic frontier production function approach, is considered. The results from this methodology confirm that there was no change in technical efficiency over the period of study, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to enhance.
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 191
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] The disparate adoption of price cap regulation in the US telecommunications and electricity sectors
    Sappington, David E. M.
    Weisman, Dennis L.
    JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 2016, 49 (02) : 250 - 264
  • [42] Does incentive regulation 'cause' degradation of retail telephone service quality?
    Banerjee, A
    INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, 2003, 15 (02) : 243 - 269
  • [43] Transmission Network Investment Using Incentive Regulation: A Disjunctive Programming Approach
    D. Khastieva
    M. R. Hesamzadeh
    I. Vogelsang
    J. Rosellón
    Networks and Spatial Economics, 2020, 20 : 1029 - 1068
  • [44] Transmission Network Investment Using Incentive Regulation: A Disjunctive Programming Approach
    Khastieva, D.
    Hesamzadeh, M. R.
    Vogelsang, I.
    Rosellon, J.
    NETWORKS & SPATIAL ECONOMICS, 2020, 20 (04) : 1029 - 1068
  • [45] A note on the technical and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers in the United States
    Uri, Noel D.
    QUALITY & QUANTITY, 2006, 40 (03) : 383 - 406
  • [46] A Note on the Technical and Allocative Efficiency of Local Exchange Carriers in the United States
    Noel D. Uri
    Quality and Quantity, 2006, 40 : 383 - 406
  • [47] Output-based incentive regulation in electricity distribution: Evidence from Italy
    Cambini, Carlo
    Croce, Annalisa
    Fumagalli, Elena
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2014, 45 : 205 - 216
  • [48] Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective
    Ingo Vogelsang
    Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, 22 : 5 - 27
  • [49] Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distribution
    Ter-Martirosyan, Anna
    Kwoka, John
    JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 2010, 38 (03) : 258 - 273
  • [50] Output-based incentive regulation: benchmarking with quality of supply in electricity distribution
    Cambini, Carlo
    Fumagalli, Elena
    Croce, Annalisa
    2012 9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET (EEM), 2012,