The objective attitude

被引:36
作者
Sommers, Tamler [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Morris, MN 56267 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.487.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I aim to alleviate the pessimism with which some philosophers regard the 'objective attitude', thereby removing a particular obstacle which RE Strawson and others have placed in the way of more widespread scepticism about moral responsibility. First, I describe what I consider the objective attitude to be, and then address concerns about this raised by Susan Wolf. Next, I argue that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with it. Finally, I examine the prospects of someone who wishes to adopt the objective attitude permanently. In response to philosophers who claim that this would be psychologically impossible, I argue chat our commitment to attitudes that presuppose moral responsibility can soften and fade, often without our noticing it.
引用
收藏
页码:321 / 341
页数:21
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