Towards a renaissance of economic theory

被引：7
作者：
Gintis, Herbert [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Santa Fe Inst, Northampton, MA 01060 USA
[2] Cent European Univ, Northampton, MA 01060 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2010年 / 73卷 / 01期
关键词：
RATIONAL COOPERATION; BACKWARD INDUCTION; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：34 / 40
页数：7
相关论文
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