Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information

被引：9

作者：

Ewerhart, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 107卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2958

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n-1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies-regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：474 / 482

页数：9

共 15 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1928, Acta Sci. Math. Szeged

[2] On rationalizability in extensive games [J].