Cognitive load and strategic sophistication

被引:28
作者
Allred, Sarah [1 ]
Duffy, Sean [1 ]
Smith, John [2 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Psychol, 311 North 5th St, Camden, NJ 08102 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, 311 North 5th St, Camden, NJ 08102 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Bounded rationality; Experimental economics; Working memory load; Cognition; Beauty contest; Rational inattention; WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY; DECISION-MAKING; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; FLUID INTELLIGENCE; STATED BELIEFS; GUESSING GAMES; PLAYERS MODELS; ABILITY; BEHAVIOR; MIND;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic sophistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subject's cognitive resources that are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a difficult number to remember) or a low cognitive load (given a number that is not difficult to remember). Subsequently, the subjects play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure is repeated for various games. We find that the relationship between cognitive load and strategic sophistication is not persistent across classes of games. This lack of persistence is consistent with recent findings in the literature. We also find that the relationship between cognitive load and actions is different from the relationship between cognitive load and beliefs. This suggests that actions and beliefs may not be as closely related as standard game theory would predict. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:162 / 178
页数:17
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