The effects of China's split-share reform on firms' capital structure choice

China's split-share structure reform in 2005-2006 mitigates agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and thus may bring substantial changes to corporate financing behaviour. This article examines the impact of that reform on the capital structure decisions of firms by applying a variety of trade-off and pecking-order models. Using data from 1176 non-financial Chinese listed firms during the period 2000-2012, we present empirical evidence indicating that equity tracks the financing deficit better than debt in Chinese firms, a finding which is not consistent with pecking-order theory. This phenomenon is more prominent after 2006 as share reform increases trading activity in the secondary stock market and improves the transparency of financial markets. In addition, Chinese firms have an optimal leverage ratio and they adjust below-target leverage ratios faster than above-target leverage ratios after the implementation of share structure reform, although they make symmetric adjustments towards the target leverage ratio before 2007. Finally, recent share reform has prompted Chinese firms to more quickly address the divergence of actual leverage ratios from long-term target levels, but has slowed their response to short-term target leverage divergence.