Information percolation in large markets

被引：64
作者：
Duffie, Darrell
Manso, Gustavo
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2007年 / 97卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1257/aer.97.2.203
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：203 / 209
页数：7
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