On the robustness of behaviour in experimental 'beauty contest' games

被引：84

作者：

Duffy, J ^{[1
]}

Nagel, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1997年 / 107卷 / 445期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0297.00250

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We report and compare results from several different versions of an experimental interactive guessing game first studied by Nagel (1995), which we refer to as the 'beauty contest' game following Keynes (1936). In these games, groups of subjects are repeatedly asked to simultaneously guess a real number in the interval [0, 100] that they believe will be closest to 1/2 times either the median, mean, or maximum of all numbers chosen. We also use our experimental data to test a simple model of adaptive learning behaviour.

引用

页码：1684 / 1700

页数：17

共 6 条

[1]

Nagel R, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P1313

[2] END BEHAVIOR IN SEQUENCES OF FINITE PRISONERS-DILEMMA SUPERGAMES - A LEARNING-THEORY APPROACH [J].