Neutral phantasies and possible emotions A phenomenological perspective on aesthetic education

In this paper I draw from Husserl's lectures on ethics and manuscripts on phantasy to clarify the role and the structure of aesthetic education within a phenomenological theory of experience. First, I show that Husserl's take on emotions as material contents of value experiences involves the problem of justifying the validity of the relation between factual emotions and ideal values. I then suggest, on the basis of some of Husserl's phenomenological claims on phantasy, that this discrepancy can be bridged through the enjoyment of art: that is, through a process of aesthetic education. I will focus, as Husserl does, on theatre as a case study. His approach to the experience of theatre provides the possibility of an education of emotions by helping the spectator to explore the eidetic structure of emotional states in their individuality, but regardless of their isolated here and now (that is, of their facticity). After a presentation of the elements that play into the phenomenological perspective, the first part of the argument refers to the last chapters of Husserl's Einleitung in die Ethik (1920/1924). The second part focuses on a 1918 manuscript. I conclude by hinting at the possibility of widening Husserl's account of aesthetic education beyond the experience of theatre.