Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption

被引:241
作者
Lindstedt, Catharina [1 ]
Naurin, Daniel [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Polit Sci, S-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
关键词
Transparency; Corruption; Democracy; Accountability; Comparative Politics; DEMOCRACY; INFORMATION; PRESS;
D O I
10.1177/0192512110377602
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
We test the commonly stated, but rarely investigated, assertion that making political institutions more transparent is an effective method for combating corruption. This assertion is confirmed with cross-national data, but also specified and qualified in several respects. Most importantly, we find that looking only at average effects gives a misleading picture of the significance of transparency for corruption. Just making information available will not prevent corruption if such conditions for publicity and accountability as education, media circulation and free and fair elections are weak. Furthermore, we find that transparency requirements that are implemented by the agent itself are less effective compared to non-agent controlled transparency institutions, such as a free press. One important implication of these findings is that reforms focusing on increasing transparency should be accompanied by measures for strengthening citizens' capacity to act upon the available information if we are to see positive effects on corruption.
引用
收藏
页码:301 / 322
页数:22
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