Do political connections affect corporate poverty alleviation decisions? Evidence from China

被引:24
作者
Zhang, Huiming [1 ]
Huang, Jiying [1 ]
Wu, Kai [2 ]
Wang, Shouyang [3 ]
Nygaard, Christian [4 ]
Qiu, Yueming [5 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, China Inst Mfg Dev, Nanjing 210044, Peoples R China
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
[4] Swinburne Univ Technol, Ctr Urban Transit, Hawthorn, Vic 3122, Australia
[5] Univ Maryland, Sch Publ Policy, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Political connections; Corporate poverty alleviation; Stochastic frontier model; FIRM PERFORMANCE; SOCIAL PERFORMANCE; CORRUPTION; RESPONSIBILITY; PHILANTHROPY; FAMINE;
D O I
10.1016/j.chieco.2022.101785
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Programs to alleviate poverty by corporations are increasingly popular as a new form of corporate social responsibility. This study examines how the political connections of a firm's chairperson are associated with decisions to alleviate poverty based on a sample of listed Chinese firms from 2016 to 2018. We find that the chairperson's political connections increase the probability of participation and the amount of investment in programs to alleviate poverty. This positive relationship is mainly manifested in firms with high agency costs and low regional economic conditions. In addition, the chairperson's political connections are not related to the efficiency of the poverty alleviation program. Politically connected firms receive less government recognition with an increase in investment in poverty alleviation. Our findings are consistent with the notion that firms participate in poverty alleviation programs for reciprocal favor exchanges, but they fail to manage these programs efficiently.
引用
收藏
页数:21
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