Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games

被引：9

作者：

Zaccour, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] GERAD, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] HEC Montreal, Dept Mkt, Montreal, PQ, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 2003年 / 117卷 / 01期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

linear-state differential games; characteristic functions; environmental economics;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1023612725533

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper addresses the issue of computation of the characteristic function values in a n-player linear-state cooperative differential game. One shows that the characteristic functions coincide under two different definitions of the strategic strength of coalitions. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.

引用

页码：183 / 194

页数：12

共 15 条

[11] Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players [J].