Compatibilism and Free Belief

被引：10
|
作者：
Booth, Anthony R. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Utrecht, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS | 2009年 / 38卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1080/05568640902933379
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
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页码：1 / 12
页数：12
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